Abstract
1: Introduction
Major technological breakthroughs in textile production and the application of steam power to production in Great Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century made a deep impression on contemporary and later observers. In the nineteenth century the term industrial revolution was coined to describe these changes in retrospect.
In many respects the term industrial revolution is misleading. It disregards the incremental nature of increases in productive capacity, the continuity with earlier developments in Northwest Europe in particular in the Low Countries and the importance of developments in other sectors of the economy. Also, the acceleration of British productivity growth only started in the early 19 th century, rather than in the eighteenth century. (Maddison, 1982 Crafts, 1983) . In other respects, industrial revolution remains an apt term. It captures the introduction of radically new production technologies which have fundamentally affected the nature of global production. The emergence of modern manufacturing had led tot dramatic changes in the structure of the world economy and to sustained increases in the growth of labour productivity and economic welfare (Maddison, 2001 .
Great Britain was the first industrialiser and it became the technological leader in the world economy. It was the exemplar for other countries. Manufacturing became the main engine of accelerating economic growth in the 19 th century. A global race for industrialisation had begun.
Industrialisation should be seen as a single global process, in which individual countries follow different paths depending on their initial conditions and moment of their entry into the race (Pollard, 1990) . The first industrial followers were European countries such as Belgium, Switzerland and France. Between 1815 and 1850, Belgium faithfully copied the English pattern 4 of industrialisation based on coal mining, engineering and textiles. It profited from rich mineral resources in the South of the country. 1 . Switzerland was a landlocked economy with no coal, iron or mineral resources and a limited internal market. It successfully concentrated on technologically advanced products such as fine silks, embroidery and watch making. France followed the British model, with typical variations based on its own initial conditions. It focused more on high quality and luxury goods than Britain, made more use of its artisanal and artistic skills and at the same time exploited its cheaper labour (Crafts, 1977; Bergier, 1983; Pollard, 1990; Von Tunzelmann, 1995) .
In the nineteenth century, the United States followed a different path towards industrialisation based on primary exports, abundance of land and natural resources, and scarcity of labour.
Labour scarcity encouraged highly capital-intensive production techniques. Technology was taken over rapidly and creatively from the technological leader Great Britain and there was an inflow of skilled labour from Europe. Technological advance was labour saving. Productivity growth in the USA was so rapid that this country would overtake Great Britain by the end of the nineteenth century. The USA has retained its technological leadership ever since.
Famous latecomers to the process of industrialisation were Germany, Russia and Japan. As argued convincingly by Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) , latecomers profit from the availability of modern technologies developed in the leading industrial economies, without bearing all the risks and costs involved in research and development. Gerschenkron referred to this as the 1 The foundations for Belgian industrialisation were laid when Belgium was still a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in from 1815 till 1830. 6 and technology acquisition. 4 Development-oriented governments set themselves the task of eliminating historical obstacles to industrialisation and challenging the economic, political and military dominance of the early industrialisers.
What about the developing countries? From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, the world economy had divided into industrial economies and agricultural economies (Arthur Lewis, 1978 a, b; Maddison, 2001 . Colonies and non-colonised countries in the tropics remained predominantly agrarian, while the Western world and the Asian latecomer Japan industrialised.
Industrial growth in the West created an increasing demand for primary products from developing countries. Technological advances in transport, infrastructure and communication expanded the opportunities for trade. Thus, the colonial division of labour came into being.
Developing countries exported primary agricultural and mining products to the advanced economies. Industrial economies exported their finished manufactured goods to the developing countries. Industrialisation became synonymous with wealth, economic development, technological leadership, political power and international dominance. The very concept of development came to be associated with industrialisation. Industrialisation was rightly seen as the main engine of growth and development.
In developing countries, moves towards industrialisation were scarce and hesitant. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, one finds such beginnings in Latin American countries such as Lewis has argued that the shear profitability of primary exports was one of main reasons for the specialisation of developing countries in primary production. But colonial policies also played a negative role. For instance, in India, textile manufacturing suffered severely from restrictive colonial policies which favoured production in Great Britain.
Whatever the reasons, the groundswell of global industrialisation, which started in Great Britain in the eighteenth century, swept through Europe and the USA and reached Japan and
Russia by the end of the nineteenth century, subsided after 1900 (Pollard, 1990) . With a few exceptions, developing countries were bypassed by industrialisation. The exceptions were countries such as Argentina, Brazil and South Africa which profited from the collapse of world trade in the crisis years of the 1930s to build up their own manufacturing industries, providing early examples of successful import substitution. In Asia, China and India experienced some degree of industrialisation in the late nineteenth century, but industrialisation only took off after these countries freed themselves from colonialism and external domination. On the whole, the developing world remained overwhelmingly oriented towards primary production.
This started to change in 1945. After a pause of fifty years developing countries rejoined the industrial race in the post-war period (e.g. Balance, et al., 1982) . Since World War II, manufacturing has emerged as a major activity in many developing countries and the shape and structure of global manufacturing production and trade has changed fundamentally. The colonial 5 Around 1750, the Indian textile industry was producing around one quarter of global textile output (e.g. Roy, 2004) . However, the basis of production was more artisanal than industrial.
8 division of labour of the late nineteenth century has been stood on its head. Large parts of manufacturing have relocated to developing countries which supply industrial exports to the rich countries. Some developing countries have experienced a process of rapid catch up which was invariably tied up with successful late industrialisation (Szirmai, 2008) . Per capita growth rates of GDP in the catch up economies vary from 5 to 9 per cent per year.
GDP growth varies from 6 to 11.5 per cent. All examples of catch-up are associated with the widespread and rapid emergence of manufacturing. Industrialisation seems to be a key driver of catch up.
One of the most interesting results in table 1 is the way catch up has accelerated since the 19 th century, due to increased globalisation, greater possibilities for international technology transfer and increasing advantages of backwardness. In the nineteenth century, GDP per capita in the catch up countries was growing at between 1.4 and 1.9 per cent per year, compared to the 5-9 per cent after 1950. The ratio of per capita GDP growth to that of the United Kingdom in the corresponding years prior to 1913 was between 1.3 and 2. After 1950, the catch up countries were growing on average three times as fast as the world leader the USA.
2: Structural Change and the Emergence of Manufacturing
The following tables document the process of structural change in developing countries in the period 1950-2005. In 1950, the share of manufacturing was only 11 per cent of GDP compared to 31 per cent in the OECD economies. This is low in comparative perspective, but higher than one would expect for countries that are just embarking on a process of industrialisation. 6 The only countries which really had negligible shares of manufacturing were Tanzania In comparative perspective we observe a long-run increase in the shares of manufacturing in developing countries and a long run contraction in the shares of manufacturing in the advanced economies. By 2005, the average share of manufacturing in the developing world is somewhat higher than in the advanced economies. Taiwan and Thailand, 1951; China and Tanzania, 1952; South Korea, 1953; Malaysia and Zambia, 1955; Ghana, Ivory Coast, 1960 . Belgium, 1953 , West Germany, Italy and Norway, 1951 , Japan, 1952 b China, 1962 Tables, 1980; OECD, 1950, unless otherwise specified from OECD, National Accounts, microfiche edition, 1971. Japan 1953 from GGDC ten sector data base Table 3 presents average shares of manufacturing for a much larger sample of 63 developing countries, including many smaller economies. The country data are reproduced in Annex Table 1 . Source: see Annex Table 1 .
3: Why is manufacturing considered to be the engine of growth?
There are powerful empirical and theoretical arguments in favour of industrialisation as the main engine of growth in economic development. The arguments can be summarised as follows: 13 1. There is an empirical correlation between the degree of industrialisation and per capita income in developing countries.
2. Productivity is higher in the industrial sector than in the agricultural sector. The transfer of resources from agriculture to manufacturing provides a structural change bonus.
3. The transfer of resources from manufacturing to services provides a structural change burden in the form of Baumol's disease. As the share of the service sector increases, aggregate per capita growth will tend to slow down.
4. Compared to agriculture, the manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for capital accumulation in developing countries. Capital accumulation can be more easily realised in spatially concentrated manufacturing than in spatially dispersed agriculture. This is one of the reasons why the emergence of manufacturing has been so important in growth and development. Capital intensity is high in mining, manufacturing, utilities and transport. It is much lower in agriculture and services. Capital accumulation is one of the aggregate sources of growth. Thus, an increasing share of manufacturing will contribute to aggregate growth.
5. The manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for economies of scale, which are less available in agriculture or services.
6. The manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for both embodied and disembodied technological progress (Cornwall, 1977) . Technological advance is concentrated in the manufacturing sector and diffuses from there to other economic sectors such as the service sector.
7. Linkage and spillover effects are stronger in manufacturing than in agriculture or mining.
Linkage effects refer to the direct backward and forward linkages between different sectors.
14 Linkage effects create positive externalities to investments in given sectors. Spillover effects refer to the disembodied knowledge flows between sectors. Spillover effects are a special case of externalities which to refer to externalities of investment in knowledge and technology. Linkage and spillover effects are presumed to be stronger within manufacturing than within other sectors. Linkage and spillover effects between manufacturing and other sectors such as services or agriculture are also very powerful.
8. As per capita incomes rise, the share of agricultural expenditures in total expenditures declines and the share of expenditures on manufactured goods increases (Engel's law).
Countries specialising in agricultural and primary production will not profit from expanding world markets for manufacturing goods.
These arguments are frequently mentioned in the literature and are often considered self-evident, though the recent literature increasing questions whether manufacturing will continue to be the engine of growth. We examine the empirical support for these arguments. In doing so, we may find that some of the arguments need to be qualified. They should also be considered in a temporal perspective. The applicability of different arguments may well differ in different historical contexts. The sources of growth change over time.
4: Empirical Correlations between Industrialisation and Economic

Development
The empirical argument points to the overall correlation between degree of industrialisation and the level of economic development. Not only are the advanced economies more industrialised, 15 than developing countries. Also, the more successful developing countries are invariably those, which have been able to industrialise. The historical record provides strong support for this correlation.
Statistically the correlation is less easy to demonstrate, because the advanced economies have become service economies where service sectors account for over two thirds of GDP. Also, the sequence of structural change in developing economies is different from the earlier patterns of structural change in the presently advanced economies. In the earlier pattern of structural change, the shares of manufacturing in GDP and employment increased first, the shares of services increased later. In developing countries the share of services in GDP was usually already larger than that of the industrial sector in the 1950s and 1960s (see table 2 above, and Szirmai, 2005) .
Therefore, one will not find much correlation between share of manufacturing in total GDP and the level of per capita income.
We have tried to capture the empirical relationship between industrialisation and development in Table 4 . In this table, we focus on the share of manufacturing in the total commodity production (i.e. agriculture and industry, including mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities) rather than in total GDP (see for a similar approach Balance et al, 1982, pp. 110 ff) . The share of manufacturing in commodities is set out against a country's per capita gross national income in 2000. We find a significant positive correlation of 0.79 between the logarithm of income per capita and the share of manufacturing.
In line with the argument in the previous section about different patterns of structural change and different initial conditions, the correlation is not a perfect one. 
5: Structural Change Bonus
A second argument in favour of industrialisation states that labour productivity in agriculture is much lower than labour productivity in industry. A transfer of labour from low productivity agriculture to high productivity industry results in an immediate increase in overall productivity and income per capita. This transfer has been a major source of growth in developing countries. It is referred to as the structural change bonus (Chenery et al., 1986; Lewis, 1954; Fei and Ranis, 1964; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999; Timmer and Szirmai, 2000; Ark, B. van, and M. Timmer, 2003; Temple and Woessman, 2006; Timmer and de Vries, 2007) . Table 5 presents data on value added per worker for a selected number of developing countries for which data are available for longer periods. It is immediately clear from this table that value added per worker is much higher in manufacturing than in agriculture. This is in line 18 with the structural bonus argument. There will be a positive static shift effect, when workers relocate to manufacturing.
It is also not surprising that labour productivity in the capital intensive mining sector is far higher than that in manufacturing. The results with regard to services are more puzzling. Between 1950 and 1970, labour productivity in the service sector in Latin American countries is much higher than in manufacturing. If this is not due to measurement error, this would suggest that transfer of resources to services would provide a higher static shift effect than to manufacturing, which is counterintuitive. From 1980 onwards, however, productivity in manufacturing is substantially higher than in services, which is more in line with our expectations. 
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In table 6, we present a comparison of growth rates in manufacturing and agriculture in a sample of developing countries (derived from the GGDC 10-sector database). These are compared with sectoral growth rates in advanced economies in the post-war period. This table provides some interesting findings which provide a more nuanced picture of the role of manufacturing in growth. Between 1950 and 1973, the growth rate of labour productivity in manufacturing is substantially higher than in agriculture and also higher than that in the total;
economy. This is even more pronounced if we look at growth of output (8.6% versus 3.9%).
Manufacturing is clearly a very dynamic sector contributing to overall growth performance. In ten of the fourteen developing countries, productivity growth in manufacturing is higher than in agriculture. In the case of value added, all countries show higher growth in manufacturing. After 1973, the picture becomes more complicated. Our sample of developing countries starts looking more like the advanced economies in that productivity growth in agriculture is systematically higher than in manufacturing. This is true for 12 out of the sixteen countries for which we have the data in the dataset (see table 7 ). However, in terms of value added the growth rate in manufacturing is still higher in most of the countries (10 out of 16). This is consistent with a shrinking share of agriculture in total value added. The same pattern can be seen in the sample of advanced economies. In terms of productivity per person engaged, the agriculture sector systematically outperforms the manufacturing sector and the total economy.
A smaller fraction of the total labour force is producing more and more output per person in agriculture. The only real exceptions are the European catch up economies Poland and Ireland, where productivity growth in manufacturing is much higher than in agriculture.
However, in terms of value added, growth, in manufacturing and the total economy is much higher than in agriculture. Its share in valued added has been systematically shrinking.
Summarising the information in tables 6 and 7, we can say that in developing countries manufacturing is indeed one of the more dynamic sectors in terms of productivity and output growth, especially in the period 1950-73. In the period 1973-2003, productivity growth in agriculture surpasses that of manufacturing, but manufacturing still dominates in terms of output growth. 
6: Structural Change Burden
In many service sectors, the possibilities for productivity growth are limited due to the inherently labour intensive nature of service production. This implies that an increasing share of services results in a productivity slowdown (Baumol's law). Such service sectors include personal services, restaurants and hotels, health care and medical services and government.
What productivity improvement there is, often takes the place of reducing quality of output or simply providing less services for the same price, so it should not show up in productivity indices if these were correctly measured using hedonic price indices.
Baumol's law has recently come under fire, because there are some very important market service sectors such as the financial sector and sales and distribution where there are major productivity improvements, based on ICT technologies.
Nevertheless the working hypothesis is that a country with a large service sector will tend to grow slower than a country with a smaller service sector. As advanced economies are predominantly service economies, this creates new possibilities for catch up in developing countries where the industrial and the manufacturing sector have a proportionately larger share in output.
On the other hand, developing countries are characterised by a very large share of the service sector at early stages of development. They did not follow the traditional linear sequence of a shift from agriculture to manufacturing, followed by a shift from manufacturing to services. As much of the large service sector in developing countries is accounted for by a large, inefficient and unproductive sector of government services, developing countries suffer from a structural 26 change burden at early stages of development. It is hard to prove this with in regression analysis, because of endogeneity. Rich countries have larger service sectors because the demand for services increases at higher level of incomes. So service sector shares are not negatively correlated with per capita income. 8 A better approach is to analyse the impact of the sectoral shares at the beginning of a period on growth rates of gdp per capita in that period (cf. Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999 Notes: a. capital intensity total calculated excluding real estate for advanced economies. Real estate refers to the residential capital stock. We assume the totals for developing countries from Larson et al. 2000 also exclude real estate; b. agricultural capital stock in developing countries refers to gross fixed capital stock excluding tree stock and cattle stock. In the advanced economy data, agricultural capital stock includes tree stock and cattle stock. This results in an upward bias in the estimates of agricultural capital intensity.
Internationally comparable data on capital stocks are scarce, especially for developing countries. In table 8, we have put together data for a selected number of developing countries from a World Bank database compiled by Larson et al. (2000) and compared these with data o In the advanced economies capital intensity the roles of agriculture and manufacturing have been reversed. Capital intensity in the small sector of agriculture is much higher than in manufacturing. This has to do with the 'industrialisation of agriculture'. In the advanced economies the share of agricultural labour and value added has declined enormously, but agriculture has become much more productive due to the application of very capital intensive technologies such as greenhouse farming, intensive pig farming, cattle farming and poultry farming, application of combines etc. etc. But there is also a measurement problem. The EUKLEMS data seem to include tree stocks and cattle stocks which I have been able to exclude in the developing country data because they do not refer to capital accumulation in the modern technological sense.
This overstates the capital intensiveness of agriculture.
o The advanced economy data illustrate that manufacturing has become one of the less capital intensive sectors of the economy. The EUKLEMS data indicate that mining, utilities and transport are the most capital intensive sectors. Agriculture also has above average capital intensity. Manufacturing has become much less important as a key 29 sector where capital accumulation takes place. There are again several measurement issues. The data in the table refer to total fixed capital formation, including fixed structures. It is very likely the in terms of machinery and equipment the data would show a more important role for manufacturing.
In economic growth accounting studies, the contribution of growth of physical capital to growth of output in post-war advanced economies turns out to be less important than previously thought. Other factors such as growth of employment, growth of human capital and disembodied technological change are very important as well (Maddison, 1987; Thirlwall, 1997) . However, for developing countries, physical capital accumulation still seems to be of great importance, because they start with so much less capital per worker (Nadiri, 1972; Thirlwall, 1997; Pilat, 1994; Hoffman, 1965 , Bosworth et al., 1995 .
8: Opportunities for Scale Economies
Historically the industrial sector (including mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities) profited in particular from economies of scale, compared to service sectors and agriculture. This is partly due to the nature of technologies which are most productively applied in large scale production. But it also has to do with learning by doing. Expansion of production expands the scope for learning (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999) . Thus, the rate of growth of productivity in manufacturing depends positively on the rate of growth of output (Verdoorn, 1949; Kaldor, 1966) .
With the rise of ICT technologies this has may have changed from the 1990s onwards. In certain service sectors, scale effects have become overwhelmingly important, as the marginal costs of providing an additional unit of service have come close to zero. The question is justified whether the role of manufacturing in future growth may become less important than in the past sixty years. The service sector might become the new engine of growth. It is too early to say whether this is indeed the case. Many service sectors, such as government, medical services, education, and personal care still suffer from Baumol's law. In the case of digitalised services, the marginal costs may be close to zero, but there is an increasing problem of appropriation of revenues from these services, as the flow of services becomes impossible to control and valorise.
9: Technological Change
The manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for both embodied and disembodied technological progress. Rapid capital accumulation is associated with embodied technological progress, as new generations of capital goods embody the latest state of the art of technology.
Disembodied technological progress refers to changes in the knowledge of product and process technologies in firms and in the economy as a whole. Since, the industrial revolution, technological advance has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector and diffuses from there to other economic sectors such as the service sector. Cornwall (1977) in particular has argued that manufacturing is the locus of technological progress.
Some brief remarks need to be made here about the difficulties in unscrambling capital accumulation and technological change. From the perspective of a developing country, the use of more capital goods per worker in itself represents an important kind of technological change.
The mode of production changes dramatically, and the mastering of new -usually importedtechnologies -requires major innovative efforts on behalf of developing countries and their firms. In this sense, all capital accumulation in developing countries represents technological 31 change. It involves the diffusion of machinery from the advanced economies and diffusion of the technologies embodied in them.
But, one needs to distinguish between the increase in the pure volume of existing capital goods (more of the same) and the shift over time from technologically less sophisticated to technologically more advanced capital goods. This is called embodied technological change. This is still a form of international diffusion of technology through capital imports, but now with the emphasis on the upgrading of the capital stock.
Next, in the course of economic development, output per unit of input (total factor productivity) can increase due to various factors, among which shifts from one economic sector to another, economies of scale and more efficient allocation of resources within sectors. One of the most important factors, which can cause increases in output per unit of input, is so-called disembodied technological change. Disembodied technological change refers to general advances in science, technology and the state of knowledge, changes in the stocks of knowledge available firms, sectors or countries; improvements in the level of knowledge absorbed by employees and managers in educational institutions and on the job (Maddison, 1987, p. 662) , learning by doing by workers and managers on the job, improvements in the collective technological capabilities of firms or the social capabilities of countries and finally positive external effects of investment in knowledge and new technologies, through spillovers from firm to firm or from country to country.
10: Linkage and Spillover Effects
Linkages are direct physical relations of intersectoral supply and demand. The positive external effect of linkages is that they can create economies of scale in the domestic economy. Spillover effects refer to the disembodied knowledge and technology flows between economic actors and economic sectors. Actors learn from each other, so that investment in technological knowledge or increased efficiency in one firm has positive external effects in the economy as a whole.
Intersectoral backward and forward linkages in manufacturing are perceived to be much stronger than in mining or agriculture which are typically characterised by weak linkages (Hirschman, 1958 , Cornwall, 1977 Myint, 1980) . Investment in one branch of manufacturing can have strong positive external effects on other sectors.
Spillover effects between manufacturing and other sectors are also very powerful. As indicated above, the manufacturing sector is one of the primary sources of technological advance in the economy as a whole. It is here that most product and process technologies are developed. One of the important spillover effects in modern economies is that from the industrial sector to other sectors, such as the service sector. Thus, advances in ICT hardware technologies produced in the manufacturing sector (silicon chips, glass fibre cables) fuel technological change in the software producing and software using service sectors.
11: The Engel Law
The argument in the previous paragraph was couched in terms of supply factors. But demand relationships also crucial for the argument that manufacturing is an engine of growth. The lower the per capita income of a country, the larger the proportion of that income will be spent on basic agricultural foodstuffs. This is the famous Engel law (Engel, 1857) . As per capita incomes increase, the demand for agricultural products will decline and the demand for industrial products will tend to increase. Economic development creates a mass market for industrial products. This creates dynamic opportunities for manufacturing. If a country remains in agriculture and fails to develop its domestic manufacturing industry, it will have to import increasing amounts of manufactured goods.
12: Engine of Growth
Contributions of manufacturing can be measured in different ways: using growth accounting techniques and econometric analysis (Bosworth, Collins and Chen, 1995; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999 , Timmer and de Vries, 2007 . Growth accounting techniques analyse what proportion of a given growth rate of national income derives from growth of manufacturing. These techniques are straightforward and transparent. But they do tend to underestimate the contributions of dynamic sectors, because they do not take various external effects and spillovers into account. The role of manufacturing in nurturing technological advance and enhancing spillovers makes the net contribution of manufacturing to aggregate growth greater than found measuring direct sectoral contributions to growth. These spillover effects are better captured with econometric techniques.
The evidence in the secondary literature is mixed. The older literature tends to emphasise the importance of manufacturing, the more recent literature places finds that the contribution of service sector has increased. Also, in the more recent literature one finds, that manufacturing tends to be more important as an engine of growth in developing countries than in advanced economies and also more important in the period 1950-1973 than in the period after 1973. Fagerberg and Verspagen (1999) regress real growth rates on growth rates of manufacturing. If the coefficient of manufacturing growth is higher than the share of manufacturing in GDP, this is interpreted as supporting the engine of growth hypothesis. Fagerberg and Verspagen find that manufacturing was typically an engine of growth in developing countries in East Asia and Latin America, but that there was no significant effect of manufacturing in the advanced economies.
In a second article by the same authors (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002) , they examine the impact of shares of manufacturing and services in three periods : 1966-72, 1973-83 and 1884-95 for a sample of 76 countries. They find that manufacturing has much more positive contributions before 1973 than after. The interpretation in both papers is that the period 1950- In sum, both the empirical information contained in this paper and the secondary literature presents a somewhat mixed picture. Manufacturing is definitely important, especially in the period 1950-73 and more so in developing countries than in advanced economies. In advanced economies, the contribution of the service sector has become more and more important and that the share of services in GDP is now well above 70 per cent in the advanced economies. This raises the question whether manufacturing will continue to be the engine of growth in catch up economies that it has been since 1950. In the following chapters of this I will chart the emergence of manufacturing in the developing world on a sector by sector basis, focusing on what activities went to which 9 As prices of services have increased far more than those of industrial goods, the share of the service sector in constant prices has increased far less and the contribution to growth will also be less than when measured at current prices. 36 countries and regions and what were the drivers of these shifts. This will involve building up a statistical database of manufacturing sectors for a major sample of developing countries from 1950-2005, combining existing sources with new materials. I will focus on the push factors which caused industries to relocate to developing countries and the pull factors which explain why some countries were so much more successful in developing their manufacturing sectors than others. I will also discuss the general technological factors which contributed to the diffusion of manufacturing, as well as the technological factors specific to different industries. I will also pay attention to industrial and technology policies which distinguish successful from less successful industrialisers. 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
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